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FRAMING THE INQUIRY: THE SOCIAL
IMPACT OF PROJECT FINANCE
A COMMENT ON BJERRE
LISSA LAMKIN BROOME*
In Project Finance, Securitization and Consensuality, Professor
Carl Bjerre compares and contrasts securitizations and project fi-
nance transactions, concluding that the differences between the two
financing techniques, although distinct, are more differences of de-
gree than of kind.1  One distinction between the two transactions that
Professor Bjerre does find significant, however, is the social impact of
project finance transactions.2  The impact on third parties as the result
of the construction and operation of a power plant in a developing
country, for instance, is likely to be enormous.  Professor Bjerre also
invites us to consider the negative impacts of the project and the more
subtle effects it may have on the citizens of the host country, includ-
ing the impact on what the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya
Sen has called the population’s “capabilities.”3  These capabilities in-
clude having a political voice, an education, civil liberties, free agency,
freedom to live on a family’s traditional land without displacement,
and maintaining traditional lifestyles.4
I second Professor Bjerre’s invitation for more analysis of the so-
cial impact of project finance transactions, especially on nonconsent-
Copyright © 2002 by Lissa Lamkin Broome
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Banking and Finance, University of North
Carolina School of Law.  Thanks to Cynthia Collins Mabel for research assistance and to Carl S.
Bjerre for enlightening discussion.
1. Carl S. Bjerre, Project Finance, Securitization and Consensuality, 12 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 411 (2002); see also STANDARD & POOR’S, INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: PROJECT
FINANCE, UTILITIES AND CONCESSIONS 20 (2000) (discussing an additional comparison be-
tween the two financing techniques), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/Resource
Center/Reference/CorporateFinance/ProjectFinance.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).  For addi-
tional links to helpful information on project finance, see Harvard Business School’s Project Fi-
nance Portal, maintained by Professor Benjamin C. Esty, at http://www.hbs.edu/projfinportal/
(last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
2. Bjerre, supra note 1, at 428.
3. Id. at 429 (quoting AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (1999)).
4. Id. at 430.
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ing third parties.  In addition, I raise some specific questions that I
would like to see explored, and for some of the questions, a few very
preliminary observations on the issues they raise.
1. How do the policy considerations relating to project finance
transactions differ (if at all) from the policy debate surround-
ing direct foreign investment in developing nations?
Professor Bjerre notes that “international project finance trans-
actions are inextricably linked to the longstanding controversies over
FDI’s [foreign direct investment’s] effects on developing nations.”5
That link should be explored further.  The text on economic devel-
opment, to which Professor Bjerre cites, sets forth seven disputed is-
sues relating to the impact of FDI by multinational corporations in
developing countries.
1. International capital movements (income flows and balance
of payments)
2. Displacement of indigenous production
3. Extent of technology transfer
4. Appropriateness of technology transfer
5. Patterns of consumption
6. Social structure and stratification
7. Income distribution and dualistic development6
Sen’s concerns—political voice, education, civil liberties, free
agency, continuing habitation of traditional family land, and mainte-
nance of traditional lifestyles—all seem to be encompassed within
item 6 (social structure and stratification).
The debate about the effects of development on poverty in the
host country is vigorous and ongoing.  A recent study of eighty coun-
ties over four decades, for instance, countered the notion that the
poor do not take part in or benefit from economic development.  The
study found that as the economy grows, the income of poor people—
defined as the bottom fifth of the population—rises by about as much
as the income of everyone else.7  If “political empowerment flows
5. Id. at 429.
6. MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 586 (7th ed. 2000).
7. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, PATHS OUT OF POVERTY: THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 22 (2000), available at http://www.ifc.org/
economics/speeches/paths_out_of_poverty.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2002) [hereinafter IFC I]
(citing David Dollar & Aart Karaay, Growth is Good for the Poor, DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
GROUP, WORLD BANK (prelim. draft, Oct. 2000)).  The International Finance Corporation is
part of the World Bank and its explicit mission is to “foster[ ] economic growth in the develop-
ing world by financing private sector investments, mobilizing capital in the international finan-
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from economic empowerment,” as some contend,8 then it is possible
that many of Sen’s concerns could be addressed by additional eco-
nomic development, including project finance, in emerging econo-
mies.  Indeed, project finance transactions may provide direct bene-
fits to the population of developing countries if the project financed is
a school or hospital.9
2. Are the policy considerations raised by Bjerre already factored
into decisions regarding the viability of a particular project fi-
nance transaction?  If the project’s sponsors do not specifically
consider the policy considerations, do the market and the rat-
ing agencies, nevertheless consider them in evaluating the eco-
nomic viability of the transaction?  Are some policy concerns
evaluated in this manner, while other, broader-reaching ones,
are not considered either explicitly or implicitly by the project’s
sponsors, investors, or lenders?
A 1996 text on project finance exhorts a balancing by the host
county of the “social costs” of project finance against the “social
benefits.”10  Notwithstanding the exhortation, the remainder of the
chapter chiefly catalogs the expected social benefits of project fi-
nance, and fails to highlight any social costs.11  Another text advises
that the “feasibility study should consider the degree of public opposi-
tion as one factor in the chance for project success.”12  Are social im-
cial markets, and providing technical assistance and advice to businesses and governments.”  Id.
at ii.
8. Id. at 25.  As indicated, there is substantial debate on this point.  Amy Chua has argued:
[M]arketization in the developing world is often destabilizing, fomenting ethnic envy
and hatred among often chronically poor majorities.  Second, in most developing coun-
tries, democracy can proceed only in deep tension with markets.  Rather than rein-
forcing the market’s efficiency and wealth-producing effects, democratization ordinar-
ily will lead to powerful ethnonationalist, antimarket pressures.  Third, ethnic division
in the developing world cannot be regarded as just another aspect of underdevelop-
ment curable by the universal prescription of free-market democracy.  On the con-
trary, the combined pursuit of marketization and democratization in the developing
world is likely to catalyze ethnic tensions, with potentially catastrophic effects, includ-
ing the subversion of both markets and democracy.
Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and De-
velopment, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1998).
9. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION, PROJECT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 3 (1999), available at http://www.ifc.org/publications/pubs/loe/loe7/loe7.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2002) [hereinafter IFC II].
10. JOHN D. FINNERTY, PROJECT FINANCING: ASSET-BASED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING
188 (1996).
11. Id.
12. SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE
161 (2d ed. 2001).  Hoffman lists (in rather cursory form) a number of relevant factors, includ-
BROOME COMMENT_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:06 PM
442 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:439
pacts on the citizens of the host country factored into the evaluation
of potential project finance transactions or are these statements
merely idealized rhetoric?
Credit rating agencies may be important sources of information
about actual practice in this area.  These agencies play an important
role in evaluating the likely success of a project finance transaction
when financing is sought publicly rather than through private funding.
Each of the three major U.S. agencies—Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s
Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings—has available, on its website or
upon request, extensive and detailed explanations of their rating cri-
teria for project finance transactions.13  The role of the rating agencies
has gained prominence in this field only in recent years, so it is possi-
ble that this information resource may not have previously been fully
exploited.14  The rating criteria suggest that the extent to which these
concerns are explicitly considered varies among the credit agencies.
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch specifically discuss political concerns
and public acceptance as crucial to a project’s success.15  Moody’s,
however, does not discuss these concerns in any detail in its written
rating criteria.
Standard & Poor’s states in its description of its philosophical
approach to analyzing project finance risk that the “legal and political
regime in which a project operates can have profound effects on its
ability to repay investors.”16  Included in the legal and political aspects
are contract enforceability and other aspects of the legal regime of the
host country, including sovereign risk such as currency risk.17  Stan-
dard & Poor’s specifically considers “site and permitting risks, [as]
sometimes synonymous with political risk,”18 and notes that
ing: environmental impact, impact on plant and animal habitats, aesthetics, historic and cultural
significance, and effect on indigenous peoples.  Id. at 160.
13. See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 1; MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, Debt
Financing of Projects In Emerging Economies: Lessons from Asia, in MOODY’S PROJECT &
INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 46 (2001); JOHN C. DELL ET AL., RATING
APPROACH TO PROJECT FINANCE (2001); FITCH, REEMERGENCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS (2001); but cf., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Fi-
nancial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619
(1999) (reflecting that credit rating agencies and their increasing role in capital markets are not
without their critics).
14. Moody’s, for instance, assigned its first rating to a project in 1991, and rated its first
cross-border transaction in 1994.  MOODY’S, supra note 13, at 46.
15. Obviously, if the project is halted as a result of public protest, the investment expecta-
tions of the project’s investors will be totally frustrated.
16. STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 1, at 20.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 31.
BROOME COMMENT_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:06 PM
2002] COMMENT 443
“[r]egulations and enacting legislation in some jurisdictions, both de-
veloped and emerging countries, leave continuous openings for proj-
ect opponents to stop projects for reasons related, or unrelated, to
siting concerns.”19  The importance of local government, federal gov-
ernment, and public support of the proposed project, garnered
through a careful public vetting process, is also emphasized as helping
to ensure acceptance of the project by those whom it affects.20  Simi-
larly, even where not required, Standard & Poor’s recommends an
environmental impact study that considers potential adverse envi-
ronmental effects of the project, as well as “[a]rcheological and his-
torical consequences,” and “indigenous peoples or ‘native title’ con-
sequences.”21
Fitch has noted in the case of project finance of basic public in-
frastructure that an impediment to a project’s success can be the “in-
ability of governments to satisfy internal political considerations often
associated with privatization,” including “public backlash,” and sug-
gests that public consultation to increase the “awareness of not only
the benefits but also the costs of private sector participation” are im-
portant.22  Fitch also identifies the selection of “projects that best fit
the national, state or local priorities for economic development,” as
an important factor in maximizing the project’s success, viewing a
“process of public hearings [as] essential.”23
Moreover, one reason public infrastructure was formerly pro-
vided by either “government-owned enterprises . . . or by privately
owned utilities subject to rate of return regulation,” was because of
the existence of “[e]xternalities whereby benefits and costs are con-
ferred upon those not a party to the transaction.”24  To the extent
these projects are now privately funded through project finance, the
externalities must still factor in the cost-benefit calculus.
3. Are the concerns greater or different in less-developed coun-
tries than in more developed countries?
Most project finance during the last two decades has taken place




22. FITCH, supra note 13, at 2.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Darrin Grimsey & Mervyn K. Lewis, Evaluating the risks of public private partnerships
for infrastructure projects, 20 INT’L J. PROJECT MGT. 107, 108 (2002).
25. IFC II, supra note 9, at 5.
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transactions in developing countries accounted for an estimated $184
billion, or a little more than half of the project finance transactions in
the world.26  The Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 significantly
dampened the increase in flow of investment dollars into developing
countries.27  Professor Bjerre is especially concerned about the detri-
mental effects of externalities in project finance transactions in devel-
oping countries,28 and provides several examples of negative effects.29
An additional example of project finance externalities in a de-
veloping country involves the now-infamous and failed Enron.  In
1995, the newly elected state government30 of Maharashta in India
cancelled an electrical power plant project by Enron, General Elec-
tric, and Bechtel.31  The reasons stated for the cancellation, including
lack of an environmental impact study and allegedly inflated prices to
be charged to Indian consumers of the electrical output, explicitly
pointed to negative effects of the project on India’s population.32  The
cancellation occurred after over $300 million had been spent on the
project.33  The project ultimately went forward after Enron agreed to
make the Maharasta state government a shareholder34 in the single
largest foreign direct investment project in India to that date.35  The
Maharastra government, however, later found that its off-take con-
tract was overly burdensome, requiring it to pay for 90% of the
plant’s capacity when its actual use amounted to less than 30% of the
output.36  Following Enron’s well-documented collapse, Enron’s stake
26. Id.
27. Id.  Moody’s reports that project finance transactions have dried up in the Asian mar-
ket in the wake of the Asian debt crisis.  MOODY’S, supra note 13, at 45.  Further, half of the
rated issues for Asian projects have defaulted and only one has an investment grade rating.  Id.
28. Standard & Poor’s adopts the terminology of “developed markets” and “emerging
markets.”  STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 1, at 7.
29. Bjerre, supra note 1, at 430–32.
30. FINNERTY, supra note 10, at 48.
31. Eric Weiner, Canceled Deal Sets Back Reforms in India, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Aug. 11, 1995, at 7.
32. Id.  Concerns were also expressed about the manner in which the contract was negoti-
ated.  Enron executives were accused of doling out bribes and kickbacks.  Id.
33. Id.  Another account reports the project as 23% complete with $600 million having
been spent at the time of cancellation.  FINNERTY, supra note 10, at 48.
34. Enron to make India’s Maharastra govt partner in Dahbol project, AFX News, Nov. 13,
1995, LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFX-Asia file.
35. Lola Nayar, Power Ministry Works Out Scheme for Dabhol, The Times of India, Dec.
29, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 30944037.
36. Id.
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in the plant is being sold.37  The 1995 cancellation by the Indian gov-
ernment is frequently cited as an example of the political risks associ-
ated with project finance and indicates that subsequent projects have
likely been evaluated even more carefully with regard to social im-
pacts and political risks.38
4. Is there a difference between project finance for public works
projects (e.g., Channel Tunnel, other infrastructure projects)
and purely private project finance (such as Euro Disney)? If
so, what guidelines should be used to help distinguish the two?
The breadth of the types of projects included under the general
rubric of “project finance” is staggering since it is broadly defined to
include “the packaging of cash flows from an operating asset.”39  Proj-
ect finance can, therefore, be utilized for a wide range of assets in a
wide range of jurisdictions.40  Whether different considerations adhere
to different types of project finance transactions is worthy of consid-
eration.
Although there is tremendous demand for private financing
(through project finance or other techniques) of basic public infra-
structure41 in developing markets, Fitch’s offers a distinction between
what it views as successful project finance to develop “industrial, en-
ergy, and telephone capacity,” and what it views as less successful ef-
forts involving project finance of basic public infrastructure systems
such as water, sewer, or transportation.42  The Fitch analysts conclude
that the basic difference between the two types of projects is “the po-
litical nature of these basic infrastructure services,” emphasizing the
necessity that the basic infrastructure project gains “broad public ac-
ceptance for a corporate role in public service.”43
The Channel Tunnel44 exemplifies a basic public infrastructure
project that is sponsored and financed privately because the govern-
37. Dahbol Power receives four initial bids for Enron stake, AFX-Asia, Feb. 1, 2002,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFX News file.
38. FINNERTY, supra note 10, at 48.
39. STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 1, at 20.
40. Id.
41. Australian commentators Darrin Grimsey and Mervyn Lewis note that recognizing in-
frastructure is easier than defining it.  Grimsey & Lewis, supra note 24, at 108.  Traditionally,
infrastructure is thought to provide “basic,” “key,” or “crucial” services and inputs into the
economy, while acknowledging that what is “basic” “varies from country to country and from
one time to another.”  Id.
42. FITCH, supra note 13, at 1.
43. Id.
44. FINNERTY, supra note 10, at 288–314 (describing the Channel Tunnel project in detail).
His description does not mention, however, the social and cultural impacts of the project noted
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ment could not or elected not to finance the project itself.45  The Fitch
analysis suggests this type of political project will only succeed if there
is broad public acceptance of it.  In addition to garnering public sup-
port, it might also be assumed that an important role for the govern-
ment is to conduct an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis that jus-
tifies the project as advancing the welfare of the public.46  This
analysis could and should include the negative externalities of the
project.  Indeed, a government is peculiarly situated to evaluate the
effects of the projects on all that will be affected by it, whether or not
it is an explicit stakeholder in the project.  In developing countries,
however, especially in nondemocratic regimes, the role of the gov-
ernment in protecting the interests of the populace as a whole may be
questionable.47
Euro Disney,48 on the other hand, exemplifies private project fi-
nance (in this case, in the entertainment industry).  For projects that
fall into this category, it is possible that either the project’s sponsors
or the host government will have less explicitly considered the inter-
ests of nonconsenting third parties.  Even for purely private project
finance transactions, however, political elements will surely be con-
sidered, especially where the project’s success is dependent at least to
some extent on broad-based public acceptance.49  In the case of Euro
Disney, public acceptance was part of the calculus explicitly factored
into determining whether the project would be financially successful.50
by Professor Bjerre.  Bjerre, supra note 1, at 433.  Finnerty describes the cost overruns and eco-
nomic risks experienced by this project and more generally associated with large transportation
projects where alternative forms of transportation (in this case ferries and airplanes) are avail-
able.  FINNERTY, supra note 10, at 314.
45. Such public works projects might include a toll road or bridge, water projects, rail proj-
ects, hospitals, or prisons.  STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 1, at 17.  Private financing is
often sought for such projects for a number of reasons, including the lack of public funds or a
market for public debt,  the furtherance of a government’s privatization strategy, bypassing op-
eration and other risks to the private party financers, and attempting to achieve greater efficien-
cies in construction and operation.  Id.
46. IFC I, supra note 7, at 24 (“Government has an important role to play in encouraging
or making ‘pro-poor’ investments that will encourage private enterprise and further develop-
ment.  Examples include backing infrastructure in poor areas, especially transportation, tele-
communications, and electricity, as in China’s program for poor areas.”).
47. See Chua, supra note 8, at 86.
48. FINNERTY, supra note 10, at 256–87 (providing a detailed description of this project).
Finnerty’s discussion addresses the failure to foresee the coming recession in addition to failure
to adequately account for various social factors that would affect part attendance.  Id. at 280.
49. IFC II, supra note 9, at 7 (stating that “[a]nything that could weaken the project is also
likely to weaken the financial returns of investors and creditors.”).
50. The calculation could, of course, be in error, as Professor Bjerre suggests it was in this
case.  Bjerre, supra note 1, at 433 & n.76
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Professor Bjerre closes by noting that at some point the exter-
nalities may be so strong that project finance transactions cannot con-
tinue to be viewed through the lens of consensuality.51  He asks us to
consider placing project finance transaction on a spectrum of consen-
suality and concludes that these transactions likely fall in the middle
range of the spectrum, between clearly consensual transaction and
clearly nonconsensual transactions.  It seems to me that each project
finance transaction is likely to have its own spot on the spectrum of
consensuality.  The amount of government involvement, the repre-
sentative and democratic nature of the government, and the public
works aspect of the project are among some of the factors that will
help to determine placement on the spectrum.  At some points on the
spectrum, sufficient consensuality may be lacking, putting the proj-
ect’s viability in question.  Clearly, Professor Bjerre is correct: the ex-
ternalities of a project finance transaction and the magnitude of the
externalities must be considered and evaluated before undertaking a
project finance transaction.  Equally clearly, additional study of these
policy considerations is warranted.
51. Id. at 436.
